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ROBIN HOOD JURISPRUDENCE: THE
TRIUMPH OF EQUITY IN AMERICAN
TORT LAW*
JOHN J. FARLEY, III**
INTRODUCTION
I am here as a former, perhaps you might say reformed, tort
lawyer. My labors in the vineyard of tort law began in 1973, and,
from 1980 until 1989, I was a Director of the Torts Branch, Civil
Division, of the United States Department of Justice. Shortly after
joining the United States Court of Veterans Appeals, my Chief
Judge, Frank Q. Nebeker, and retired New Hampshire Chief Judge
Bill Grimes, asked me to survey the massive changes that have oc-
curred in tort law and to identify the major trends that might be
useful in divining where the law might go in the 1990's and be-
yond. I was specifically directed to call upon you to repent if you
have been among those who have strayed from classic tort doctrine
* These remarks were prepared for delivery to the American Bar Association Appellate
Judges Seminars in Orlando, Florida, on February 28, 1990, and Honolulu, Hawaii, on
January 23, 1991.
** Associate Judge, United States Court of Veterans Appeals. I would like to express
my appreciation and gratitude to Elisabeth Monaco for her invaluable research and sugges-
tions and to William H. Bristow, III, for his comments on the numerous drafts.
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and to secure a commitment in blood that you will go henceforth
and sin no more.
I suspect that many of you, like me, have taken a micro view
of tort law because your focus at any given point in time was upon
the particular case, parties, and issues before you. For this presen-
tation, I was able to take a more macro approach, to look at the
development of tort law from a perspective far broader than that
required to litigate-or to decide-a specific case. I was surprised
to come to the realization that the classic rules of tort analysis
dealing with concepts of duty, foreseeability, and causation receive
only lip service today.' Rather than a limitation upon liability,
modern causation has become a license for courts to reach a de-
sired result by employing "mixed considerations of logic,, common
sense, justice, policy and precedent. ' '2 We have come full circle; to-
day there is but one rule, and it is a rule derived from the law of
equity as it was applied by the King of England and his Lord
Chancellor in the Middle Ages: an injured plaintiff is entitled to
compensation from some or all who have the resources to pay.
I. ANGLO SAXON JURISPRUDENCE: THE RISE OF THE LAW OF
EQUITY
The law of torts can be traced back to a simple root: ven-
geance, the blood feuds of primitive societies. Clan or tribal war-
fare eventually gave way to individual action, and, in the early
years, when there was still no distinction made between tort and
crime, the old appeals3 of murder, mayhem, and larceny led to trial
by battle or combat. Later it became possible for an accused ag-
gressor to buy his way out of a blood feud or trial by battle by
paying money or something of value to the victim or his clan. In-
creasingly, a sum of money also had to be paid to the king or feu-
dal lord, a practice which soon became so onerous that it was all
but impossible for the tortfeasor to "buy back the peace once it
1 Professor Aaron D. Twerski, my torts professor and mentor, describes himself in the
preface to a 1987 products liability text as "an Orthodox Hassidic Rabbi from Brooklyn
(who happens to also be a products liability nut)." J. HENDERSON, JR. & A.D. TwERSKi,
PRODUCTS LIABILrry: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS at xxvi (1987). He pounded into me the need
for strict duty analysis in each and every tort case.
2 See C. REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND 11 (1980).
3 "The word 'appeal' has had two meanings in the law. There is the one today familiar:
review by a higher court of the judgment of a lower. The other is strange now even to
attorneys: it was the name of a criminal proceeding brought not by government but by a




Some time soon after the Battle of Hastings and the Norman
Conquest of 1066, a tortfeasor was permitted to surrender himself
and his goods to the king and beg for clemency (perhaps this was
the forerunner of modern bankruptcy practice!). The wrongdoer
was then at the mercy of the king and, upon payment of an
amercement or fine, he received the king's protection. "The list of
conduct meriting amercement was voluminous: trespass, improper
or false pleading, default, failure to appear, economic wrongs, torts,
and crime... ." The king's fines became so arbitrary and abusive
that the practice was among the grievances specifically addressed
by the Magna Carta in 1215. After the Magna Carta, the amount
of an amercement was initially set by the court and could be re-
duced by the defendant's peers.'
The principal basis of wealth in the Middle Ages was land,
and, under the Normans, all land belonged to the king; those fortu-
nate enough to hold land did so as tenants at the pleasure of the
king. Various classes of subtenants owed their livelihood and exis-
tence to these feudal lords, who ruled their realms as both judge
and jury. The Normans had established an efficient system of cen-
tral control through this strict feudal structure and, in the thir-
4 Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REv.
139, 154 (1986).
5 Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 288 (1989) (citations
omitted).
6 The ancient topic of amercements was recently debated in the Supreme Court of the
United States. Justice O'Connor suggested that the excessive fines clause of the eighth
amendment might serve to limit punitive damages in tort cases. Pointing out that the clause
has its roots in the Magna Carta prohibition of disproportionate amercements, she quoted
Romeo and Juliet to suggest that fines and punitive damages were indistinguishable from
amercements:
"I have an interest in your hate's proceeding,
My blood for your rude brawls doth lie a-bleeding;
But I'll amerce you with so strong a fine,
That you shall all repent the loss of mine."
Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 290 (quoting W. SHAKESPEARE, RoMEo AND JULIET, at I.i. 186-
189).
The majority "confidently" dismissed the argument in a footnote, claiming that "dam-
ages and amercements were not the same." Id. at 270 n.13. Responding to Justice
O'Connor's "reliance on the Bard," the majority observed:
"Though Shakespeare, of course,
Knew the Law of his time,
He was foremost a poet,
In search of a rhyme."
Id. at 265 n.7.
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teenth century, their royal courts began to lay the foundations for
the common law by taking the place of the local or feudal courts,
instituting jury trials and prosecution of crimes by the crown.
To gain access to the royal courts, a prospective plaintiff had
to secure a writ, which was an order signed by the Lord Chancellor
in the name of the king directing that the defendant appear in
court and show cause why plaintiff should not prevail. The condi-
tions for a writ were strict, and, without a writ, no remedy existed.
The original thirteenth century civil writ of trespass, which dealt
with actions of violence or forcible injury, was supplemented in the
fourteenth century by the writ of trespass on the case, which ap-
plied to injuries that had not resulted from force. If a plaintiff
could not fit his claim into one of these two writs, no actionable
tort claim would be recognized. It was not until the Common Law
Procedure Act of 1852 eliminated the strict writ requirements that
courts were permitted to entertain tort actions resulting from a
wider variety of circumstances.'
The adverse decisions that resulted from the strict application
of the common law by the royal courts led to an increasing number
of appeals to the king, "the fountain of justice," who was bound by
no rule or writ. As the number of appeals grew, the job of deciding
them eventually was delegated to the Lord Chancellor; Vice-Chan-
cellors were soon appointed; and finally a Court of Chancery devel-
oped. The law of equity had arrived.
Originally regarded as a supplement to the common law, the
law of equity was governed not by technicalities, but by fairness
and flexibility. Equity dealt either with matters not covered by the
common law or with inequitable results compelled by the common
law. The letter and the spirit of the law of equity can be seen in
some of the maxims that developed over the years:
- Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy.
- He who seeks equity must do equity.
- He who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
- Delay defeats equity or equity aids only the vigilant.
- Equality is equity.
- Equity looks to the intent rather than the form.
- Equity looks on that as done which ought to be done.
7 This change paved the way for the landmark decision of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3
H.L. 330 (1868), the predicate for the modem doctrine of strict liability.
1000 [Vol. 65:997
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- Where the equities are equal, the first in time shall prevail.8
The less restrictive equity courts became increasingly popular
over time, resulting in centuries of competition with the common
law courts. Chancery and common law judges often issued contra-
dictory verdicts in the same matter. The disputes became so severe
that in the seventeenth century, King James I ordered the Lord
Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice, the head of the common
law courts, to submit their differences to the Attorney-General, Sir
Francis Bacon. Following Bacon's recommendation, James I de-
clared that equity would prevail when there was an irresolvable
conflict between equity and the common law. Despite this ruling,
the common law courts never completely acquiesced until 1873,
when the Judicature Acts eliminated all of the then-existing
courts, created a unified court structure, and directed that equity
and common law be applied in tandem. The Acts specifically pro-
vided that in the case of a conflict, equity would prevail. Thus, in
the latter nineteenth century, the breakdown of the rigid technical-
ities of the common-law of torts, as well as the merging of equity
and the common law principles in a single court system, created
the fertile ground from which modern tort law sprang.
Let us return for a brief moment to the time of the birth of
the law of equity. The economic and living conditions were so se-
vere, particularly for the serfs and vassals, that many took to the
hills and the forests, lived outside the established order, and
preyed upon the countryside and their countrymen. It is appar-
ently from this historical setting, when bands of robbers roamed
the realm, that the legend of Robin Hood arose. I am saddened to
have to report that while the tales of Robin Hood are many, there
is little historical proof that he actually existed.9 The earliest bal-
lads, which reportedly dated from at least the fourteenth century,
recounted tales of rebellious behavior with attacks upon the re-
sources and the representatives of authority, principally the Sheriff
of Nottingham. Robin Hood treated women, the poor, and the
serfs far better than he did the establishment. This gave rise to the
legend that he and his band took from the rich to give to the poor,
from those who had to those who had not. It is perhaps not an
accident that the legend of Robin Hood arose at the same time
that the law of equity began to flourish. And, as we will see, mod-
G.W. KEETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY 112 (1956).
9 See 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 615 (1981).
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ern tort law, which many critics believe has come to be nothing
more, nor less, than a vehicle for reallocating economic resources,
borrows extensively from both sources.
II. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE THROUGH 1980: THE TRIUMPH OF
EQUITY
Tort law in the United States prior to the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, like the infant nation, lacked cohesion. The time has been
described as a period of "no-liability" because of various court-
made immunities, limited concepts of duty, and, borrowing from
our Anglo-Saxon heritage, restrictively technical notions of what
constituted an actionable claim. However, as the importance of the
distinction between trespass and trespass on the case declined,
courts came to rely more and more upon the concept of fault as
justification for shifting the cost of accidents from victims to
defendants. 10
In a 1989 article,1 Dean Fox referred to the twin cases of
Losee v. Buchanan12 and Losee v. Clutel3 as illustrative of the
thinking and limitations of nineteenth century tort law:
Buchanan, a paper company, had bought a steam boiler from
Clute. The boiler exploded onto the property of Losee, destroying
Losee's buildings and personal property. Losee sued Buchanan,
but Buchanan, free from negligence, won. Losee then sued Clute,
the manufacturer, for negligent manufacture of the boiler. But
Clute had contracted only with the paper company; consequently
it owed lessee "no duty whatever," and Losee lost again. If ab-
sence of fault did not rule out recovery, absence of privity usually
did.14
Fault was an absolute prerequisite to any recovery in the lat-
ter half of the nineteenth century. For example, when Mr. Kendall
attempted to separate two fighting dogs with a stick, he inadver-
tently stuck Mr. Brown in the eye. In overturning a jury verdict for
Mr. Brown and ordering a new trial, Chief Judge Shaw wrote:
The rule is . . . that the plaintiff must come prepared with evi-
10 See generally G.E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELXEcTuAL HISTORY (1980).
11 Fox, A Century of Tort Law-Holmes, Traynor, and Modern Times, TRmL, July
1989, at 78.
12 51 N.Y. 476 (1873).
" 51 N.Y. 494 (1873).
1' Fox, supra note 11, at 80.
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dence to show either that the intention was unlawful, or that the
defendant was in fault; for if the injury was unavoidable and the
conduct of the defendant was free from blame, he will not be lia-
ble. If, in the prosecution of a lawful act, a casualty purely acci-
dental arises, no action can be supported for an injury arising
therefrom.15
This requirement of fault was consistent with an earlier New York
decision in Harvey v. Dunlop.16 In denying recovery for a five-year-
old girl who was inadvertently struck by a stone thrown by a six-
year-old boy, the New York Court of Correction of Errors stated:
No case or principle can be found, or if found can be maintained,
subjecting an individual to liability for an act done without any
fault on his part .... All the cases concede that an injury arising
from accident, or, which in law or reason is the same thing, from
an act that ordinary human care and foresight are unable to
guard against, is but the misfortune of the sufferer, and lays no
foundation for legal responsibility. 17
Thus, it is understandable that Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
would write in The Common Law in 1881: "The general principle
of our law is that loss from accident must lie where it falls, and
this principle is not affected by the fact that a human being is the
instrument of misfortune."18
How far we have come in a little over 100 years! The notion
that privity, a concept that arose in the law of contracts, must ex-
ist between a plaintiff and a defendant before there could be a re-
covery in tort was the first to fall. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.,19 then Judge Benjamin Cardozo, after making specific refer-
ence to Mr. Losee's plight, changed the rules by concluding that
although there was no direct or contractual relationship between
the plaintiff and Buick, the absence of such a relationship would
not bar recovery.
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently made [and] ... there
is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other
than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective
of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a
25 Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 295-96 (1850) (citation omitted).
16 Lalor Supp. to Hill & Den. 193 (N.Y. 1843).
17 Id. at 194.
IsO.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 94 (1881).
19 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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duty to make it carefully. 20
Fully cognizant of the step he was taking, Judge Cardozo blazed
the trail for the expansion of liability that we have witnessed and
effectively buried any vestiges of contract law that remained lurk-
ing in our tort law:
In such circumstances, the presence of a known danger, attendant
upon a known use, makes vigilance a duty. We have put aside the
notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the conse-
quences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and
nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it
ought to be. We have put its source in the law.2
The next major change began quietly on a Sunday morning,
August 24, 1924. That day, like December 7, 1941, is a day that
truly will live in infamy for it was on that day that rules of equity
began to dominate American tort law. That was the day that Helen
Palsgraf took her two daughters, Lillian and Elizabeth, to the Long
Island Railroad East New York station in Brooklyn and bought
tickets for a ride to Rockaway Beach. The facts of Palsgraf v. Long
Island Railroad22 were succinctly laid out by Chief Judge Cardozo
in his opinion for the majority:
Plaintiff was standing on a platform of defendant's railroad after
buying a ticket to go to Rockaway Beach. A train stopped at the
station, bound for another place. Two men ran forward to catch
it. One of the men reached the platform without mishap, though
the train was already moving. The other man, carrying a package,
jumped aboard the car, but seemed unsteady as if about to fall. A
guard on the car, who had held the door open, reached forward to
help him in, and another guard on the platform pushed him from
behind. In this act, the package was dislodged, and fell upon the
rails. It was a package of small size, about fifteen inches long, and
was covered by a newspaper. In fact it contained fireworks, but
there was nothing in its appearance to give notice of its contents.
The fireworks when they fell exploded. The shock of the explo-
sion threw down some scales at the other end of the platform,
many feet away. The scales struck the plaintiff, causing injuries
for which she sues. 23
:0 Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
'1 Id. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053 (emphasis added).
22 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
22 Id. at 340-41, 162 N.E. at 99.
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I will not bore you with extensive recitation of the mountain of
comment and scholarship generated by this case. Suffice it to say
that the decision was four to three with Chief Judge Cardozo writ-
ing for the bare majority and Judge Andrews for the dissenters.
The issue, simply stated, was whether the Long Island Railroad
was liable in negligence to Helen Palsgraf. Chief Judge Cardozo
treated the case not as one of causation but of duty. He held that
the Long Island Railroad was not liable to Mrs. Palsgraf because
the guard was not under a legal duty to protect her from the risk
of injury due to exploding fireworks. Such an injury was "unfore-
seeable," and therefore it was irrelevant whether a "causal rela-
tion" existed between the negligence of the guard in dislodging the
package and Mrs. Palsgraf's injury.24 Judge Andrews dismissed
Chief Judge Cardozo's limited notion of duty: "[W]e are told that
'there is no negligence unless there is in the particular case a legal
duty to take care, and this duty must be one which is owed to the
plaintiff himself and not merely to others.' This I think too narrow
a conception. ' 25 He continued:
The proposition is this: Every one owes to the world at large the
duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably
threaten the safety of others. Such an act occurs. Not only is he
wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected to result,
but he also who is in fact injured, even if he be outside what
would generally be thought the danger zone.
26
Where Chief Judge Cardozo found the existence of a relation-
ship a precondition for negligence, Judge Andrews saw universal
duty regardless of any relationship. But even Judge Andrews be-
lieved that this universal duty was not without limit, and that limit
was proximate cause. "What we do mean by the word 'proximate'
is that, because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of
justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events be-
yond a certain point. ' 27 In essence, Chief Judge Cardozo and Judge
Andrews argued about apples and oranges with Chief Judge Car-
dozo's apples winning the battle because he had the votes; how-
ever, Judge Andrews' oranges won the war.2"
24 Id. at 340-47, 162 N.E. at 99.
25 Id. at 348-49, 162 N.E. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
268 Id. at 350, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 352, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
28 See R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 120 (1963). Professor Keeton
concluded as follows:
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In the sixty-two years since Palsgraf was decided, it is the dis-
sent of Judge Andrews, his concept of "universal duty," and his
definition of "proximate cause" that have prevailed. Indeed, his, if
you will, "equitable" definition of proximate cause has been ele-
vated to doctrine: In 1941, Dean Prosser wrote in his treatise, The
Law of Torts, that "'proximate cause,' cannot be reduced to abso-
lute rules . . . 'it is always to be determined on the facts of each
case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice,
policy and precedent.'"29 I submit that this definition is precisely
the standard that the Lord Chancellor began to use in the courts
of equity in the thirteenth century, and it is this equitable stan-
dard, as interpreted and applied by the judges of this land, that
led to the vast expansion of tort liability.
As courts inexorably continued down the path of finding ways
to permit injured plaintiffs to recover, they followed the map
drawn by Chief Judge Cardozo in MacPherson by finding that a
defendant owed a duty to an injured plaintiff and "put its source
Since the rendition of the Palsgraf decision in 1928, hundreds of judges and
commentators and thousands of students and lawyers have spent millions of hours
in the communication of billions of thoughts about the Palsgraf problem. Who
knows what tort law might have been today had all this intellectual energy been
directed elsewhere? Who knows the scope of the consequences of which Palsgraf
is the sine qua non?




What I want to tell you is that your. . . story about the woman being hit by
the scales on the subway platform when the guards knocked a package of fire-
works out of a fellow's hands gave me a real bang .... I once saw something like
that myself ....
Me and my buddies-we were what you would call juveniles-we were playing
a game something like that game of rush .... One kid starts pushing another and
pushes somebody else till pretty soon you have a whole line headed hell-bent for a
crash against some poor sucker who's looking the other way. The subway was a
great place to play the game .... Well, one day we misfired and instead of hitting
a sucker we hit some scales on the station platform, and they fell over and hit this
dame with her two kids. Fortunately somebody set off some fireworks just then. It
was real funny. This dame says to one of her two little girls, "What happened,
Lillian?" and some deep voice timed just right to sound like it was Lillian answer-
ing says "It's a hell of a way to run a railroad."
Id. at 120-22.
2 W. PROSSER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1941), quoted in G. E. WHrrE, supra
note 10, at 101.
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in the law,"30 often after the fact. To demonstrate the point, let us
look at new duties that have been found and some of the causes of
action that have been created since MacPherson and Palsgraf.
Constitutional Tort: It was also in Brooklyn, on July 7, 1967,
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, that a pro se suit was filed by one Webster Bivens. Mr. Biv-
ens sought $15,000 from six unknown federal agents because he be-
lieved that his constitutional rights had been violated when he was
arrested and searched on November 26, 1965. The district judge
dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a
cause of action. In denying Bivens' motion for leave to appeal in
forma pauperis, the district judge wrote:
It is abundantly clear that no federal question is presented
by the complaint.
The court adheres to its prior ruling dismissing the complaint
on the merits. Under the circumstances, an appeal would be frivo-
lous. The court certifies that the appeal is not taken in good
faith. 1
Notwithstanding that it was "abundantly clear" that an ap-
peal would be "frivolous" and "not taken in good faith," 2 the Su-
preme Court ultimately held that Bivens, by now represented by
court-appointed counsel, had stated a cause of action. "Having
concluded that petitioner's complaint states a cause of action
under the Fourth Amendment, we hold that petitioner is entitled
to recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered as a re-
sult of the agents' violation of the Amendment."3 On remand, af-
ter a determination by the Second Circuit that the doctrine of offi-
cial immunity would not be a bar to recovery, the case returned to
Brooklyn, where it was settled for $500.00. In his concurring opin-
ion, Justice Harlan stated:
[I]t is apparent that some form of damages is the only possi-
ble remedy for someone in Bivens' alleged position. It will be a
rare case indeed in which an individual in Bivens' position will be
able to obviate the harm by securing injunctive relief from any
court. However desirable a direct remedy against the Government
3o MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
31 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F. Supp. 12,
16 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1970).
2 Id.
33 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1970).
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might be as a substitute for individual official liability, the sover-
eign still remains immune to suit. Finally, assuming Bivens' inno-
cence of the crime charged, the "exclusionary rule" is simply ir-
relevant. For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing.4
It is clear from the candor of Justice Harlan that the driving
force behind the creation of the new "constitutional tort" was the
equitable maxim: "Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a
remedy."
Products Liability (DES): It is in the same spirit, perhaps
with even more candor, that the court ruled in the DES case of
McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories.5 When it became apparent
that the plaintiff could not establish that the product administered
to her mother was made by a specific manufacturer, Judge Garrity
lifted the traditional burden of proof from her shoulders and im-
posed a "market share" theory of liability.
Finally, the magnitude of the physical and psychological inju-
ries which are at issue in DES cases counsels toward permitting a
remedy under some form of market-share theory of liability. As
between the injured plaintiff and the possibly responsible drug
company, the latter is in a better position to absorb the cost of
injury. The company can insure itself against liability, absorb the
damage award, or distribute it among the public as a cost of doing
business, thereby spreading the cost over all consumers. In many
cases the only alternative will be to place the burden solely on
the injured plaintiff. 8
Just as it was the alleged violation of Webster Bivens' fourth
amendment rights that prompted the creation of the "constitu-
tional tort," it was the "magnitude of the physical and psychologi-
cal injuries 3 7 sustained by Shelley McCormack that gave rise to a
new equitable theory of liability in Massachusetts.
Third Party Liability: A therapist and an employer have a
duty to warn potential victims of a dangerous patient. This duty
was held to arise from the foreseeability of harm."8
Id. at 409-10 (Harlan, J., concurring).
:5 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985).
36 Id. at 1526 (emphasis added).
37 Id.
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434-43, 551 P.2d 334, 342-49,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22-29 (1976). But see Brenneman v. State, 208 Cal. App. 3d 812, 818-20,
256 Cal. Rptr. 363, 367-68 (1989) (public entities and employees have no affirmative duty to




Social Host Liability: Legislatures through dram shop acts
and courts through common law decisions have subjected tavern
owners to liability for damages caused by those to whom they serve
alcohol. Some states have extended this liability to social hosts
who serve drinks in private homes.3 9
Accountants: An actionable duty of care is now owed to any-
one who might reasonably rely upon financial statements.40
Municipalities: There has been a steady progression from sov-
ereign immunity to sovereign responsibility.
41
Strict Liability: Although it evolved from negligence, implied
warranty, and res ipsa loquitur,42 strict liability began to stand on
its own in the 1960's. 41
Products Liability: With privity dismissed as a bar to recovery
and strict liability the rule, plaintiffs were increasingly able to
reach the juries upon theories of product defect, failure to warn,
and design defect. Successor corporations were held liable for the
acts of their predecessors, and, when plaintiffs could not meet the
burden of identifying the exact manufacturer of the product caus-
ing the injury, whole industries were held to answer in damages
proportionate to their share of the market. Helene Curtis Indus-
tries V. Pruitt" is a striking example of the influence of equity in
products liability cases.
Until Americans have a comprehensive scheme of social insur-
ance, courts must resolve by a balancing process the head-on col-
lision between the need for adequate recovery and viable enter-
prises. This balancing task should be approached with a
realization that the basic consideration involves a determination
of the most just allocation of the risk of loss between the mem-
bers of the marketing chain.45
3, See, e.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 548-51, 476 A.2d 1219, 1224-25 (1984);
Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 267-77, 366 N.W.2d 857, 861-65 (1985).
40 See International Mortgage Co. v. John B. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App.
3d 806, 817-21, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 225-27 (1986).
41 See DeLong v. County of Erie, 89 A.D.2d 376, 384-89, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887, 892-93 (4th
Dep't 1982), aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 457 N.E.2d 717, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983) (county held
liable because assistance from 911 not quick enough to save life).
42 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 459-61, 150 P.2d 436, 439-40
(1944).
43 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62-64, 377 P.2d 897, 900-01,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700-01 (1962).
44 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968).
45 Id. at 862 (citation omitted).
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Wrongful Birth: Courts have permitted wrongful birth actions
by parents against physicians based upon the failure of a steriliza-
tion procedure,46 a failed abortion,4" the failure to inform of an ac-
tual or possible birth defect,48 and negligent preconception genetic
counseling 49 thus denying the parents the option of abortion. In
Smith v. Cote,50 the court noted that "[o]f the jurisdictions that
have considered the issue [of wrongful birth], only North Carolina
refuses to allow recovery." 51 Moreover, the Smith court recognized
the profound impact of the Supreme Court decision in Roe v.
Wade 52 on subsequent wrongful birth cases: "[W]e believe that
Roe is controlling; we do not hold that our decision would be the
same in its absence. ' 53 The impact of Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services54 remains to be seen.
Wrongful Life: The California judiciary, in Curlender v. Bio-
Science Laboratories,55 was the first to recognize a wrongful life
cause of action brought by a child against a physician or health
care provider for the burden of having to live in an impaired
state.5 6 Turpin v. Sortini57 curtailed the Curlender decision some-
what by refusing to grant general damages, including damages for
pain and suffering, to the impaired infant. Wrongful life suits have
also been permitted by the highest courts of Washington 58 and
New Jersey.59 An intermediate Indiana appellate court recently
permitted a wrongful life suit on behalf of a potentially impaired
child conceived by institutionalized parents who allegedly were not
" See, e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 244, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (1982) (failed sterili-
zation gave rise to damage recovery); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 184, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300,
303 (4th Dep't 1980) (damages recovered).
' See Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 704, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 656 (1976).
'8 See Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 239-41, 513 A.2d 341, 346-48 (1986).
See Viccaro v. Milunsky, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 2, 1990, at 33, col. 2 (Mass. Mar. 1, 1990).
50 128 N.H. 231, 513 A.2d 341 (1986).
51 Id. at 238, 513 A.2d at 345 (1986) (citing Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 116-17,
337 S.E.2d 528, 537 (1985)).
52 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
53 Smith, 128 N.H. at 239, 513 A.2d at 346.
492 U.S. 490 (1989).
" 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
" See id. at 828-29, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488 ("injury, of course, is not the particular defect
with which a plaintiff is afflicted-considered in the abstract-but it is the birth of the
plaintiff with such a defect").
5" 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
58 See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 478-83, 656 P.2d 483, 494-97
(1983).
11 See Procanik v. CiUo, 97 N.J. 339, 350-51, 478 A.2d 755, 761-62 (1984).
[Vol. 65:9971010
ROBIN HOOD JURISPRUDENCE
adequately supervised by the defendant nursing home.60
My favorite example of an equitable, result-oriented decision
is Lombardo v. Hoag.6 In holding that a nonowner of a vehicle
could be liable to an injured passenger when he negligently re-
turned the vehicle to its allegedly "buzzed" owner, the judge wrote:
Society demands ... that a person exercise a duty of care towards
another person in order to insure that the other person remains
free from harm, if he can do so without peril to himself. And it
demands an atmosphere in which all persons will expect that
others will conduct themselves in such a manner. Defendant
Niemeyer had an obligation in the law to do what he could to see
that Hoag did not drive his vehicle while intoxicated. And, it is of
no particular moment whether we express that obligation in
terms of duty, or in terms of proximate cause or foreseeable risk,
or whether we premise it on some legal rule such as negligent
entrustment, or assistance and encouragement, or negligently
permitting improper persons to use certain chattels, or entrust-
ment of a chattel by a person known to be incompetent, or any-
thing else for that matter.62
Such a statement is pure heresy in the church of traditional
tort theory, where duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages
are distinct elements, each requiring a separate precise analysis
and determination. However, it accurately reflects the state of tort
law in 1990. Robin Hood-and Judge Andrews-would have
understood.
III. A WORD ABOUT INSURANCE
In searching for some insight into our Anglo-Saxon heritage
and tort law, I came across the following quote from a Professor
Heldrich from the University of Munich:
The interplay of tort law and modern insurance practices has re-
sulted in a socialization of the risks and losses that are inevitable
in modern society. The ancient starting point of tort law-"the
loss lies where it falls"-has largely been replaced by its modern
counterpart-"the loss lies with the community."6 3
60 See Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 962, 965-66 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), afld in
part, vacated in part, 575 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 1991).
41 237 N.J. Super. 87, 566 A.2d 1185 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989).
62 Id. at 95, 566 A.2d at 1189-90 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
63 18 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNCA 525 (MacropAEdia 15th ed.).
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The shift of the burden of a loss from where it falls to the commu-
nity as a whole was a massive one which mirrored the equally mas-
sive changes in our economic structure and institutions. As we
grew from neighborhood to global economic relationships, tort law
kept pace and, beginning with the workers' compensation plans,
the insurance industry became a major player.
In the late nineteenth century, as commerce and industry de-
veloped on an increasing scale, injuries and deaths resulting from
industrial accidents multiplied. The courts were ill-equipped to
deal with the number of claims, assuming, of course, that they
could be shoehorned to fit within the strict pleading requirements
and fault could be proved. Germany enacted the first workers'
compensation plan in 1886, and Great Britain soon followed suit.
In the United States, the first compulsory coverage plan was
adopted by New York. 4 The central feature of the workers' com-
pensation plans was a trade-off: an injured worker gave up the
common law right to bring a damage action against the employer
in return for an automatic recovery without having to prove fault.
Workers' compensation was the first, but certainly not the last, leg-
islative venture into "no-fault" recovery.
Insurance premiums became a necessary cost of doing business
for virtually every enterprise, and, as the need for insurance grew,
so did the power of the insurance industry. The Swine Flu Emer-
gency provides perhaps the best example of this raw power and its
most effective use. In 1976, there was widespread belief that the
prospect of a swine flu epidemic presented the United States with
a major public health problem. The issue was escalated to Presi-
dential level, and emergency legislation was requested from Con-
gress. Round-the-clock committee meetings produced a legislative
plan providing for the manufacture, distribution, and administra-
tion of a vaccine to virtually the entire nation. When the drug
manufacturers sought to determine the cost of insurance in order
to be able to set a price for the vaccine, they were advised by their
insurers that policies then in existence would not apply and that
new coverage would not be written because of the advance of strict
liability and the uncertainties inherent in any prediction as to the
" In 1911, the plan was struck down as violative of the due process clauses of both the
federal and state constitutions. See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 292-300, 94
N.E. 431, 439-42 (1911). New York amended its state constitution to authorize the adoption
of a compensation system, and the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the scheme did not
violate the federal constitution. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 206-07 (1917).
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nature and extent of potential injuries. The drug companies were
willing to provide the vaccine at cost, but they were not willing to
run the risk of facing the prospect of tort suits without liability
insurance.
At the eleventh hour, over a weekend, a bill was drafted to
provide that the manufacturers could not be named as defendants
in any suits resulting from the program if they kept within the
statutory and regulatory requirements. The United States was of-
fered up as the only viable defendant. The Senate passed the legis-
lation; so did the House, without even waiting for copies of the
Senate bill. It was signed by President Ford on August 12, 1976.65
In essence, by refusing to provide coverage, the insurance industry
was able to shift the burden of liability from itself and the manu-
facturers to the taxpayer at an ultimate cost, as of October 1990, of
$92,833,020.
Since the late nineteenth century, the insurance industry has
been a major player in the economic growth of industrial societies
and in the development of tort law. Judges wrote opinions, and,
instructions to the contrary notwithstanding, juries reached deci-
sions predicated upon the common knowledge that institutional
and individual defendants were insured. And it was this convic-
tion, in major part, that fed the expansion of liability.
IV. THE "LIABILITY CRISIS" OF THE 1980's
While some commentators continue to question whether, in
fact, there ever was a "Liability Crisis," there can be no doubt that
the public perceived that something was wrong with the system.
The media-daily newspapers, weekly general and trade maga-
zines, and nightly newscasts-fed a "crisis" mentality that was re-
inforced by rising consumer prices, the disappearance of products
and services from the market, and reports of huge increases in the
number and amounts of plaintiffs' verdicts in tort cases.
Jury Verdict Research, Inc., reported that in 1975 there were
three verdicts in medical malpractice cases and nine in products
liability cases that exceeded one million dollars. In 1984, the corre-
sponding figures were seventy one and eighty six."' In addition,
65 See National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat.
1113.
" REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, ExTENT AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AvAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986)
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there was
dramatic growth in both the frequency and size of punitive dam-
ages awards in product liability litigation. Before 1970 there was
only one reported appellate decision upholding an award of puni-
tive damages in a product liability case, and that was an award of
$250,000. As of 1976, only three punitive damages verdicts, none
in excess of $250,000, had been upheld in reported appellate
product liability decisions. Today, hardly a month goes by with-
out a multimillion-dollar punitive damages verdict in a product
liability case.67
At the same time, the insurance industry was hit with astro-
nomical losses of $21 billion in 1984 and $25 billion in 19858 and it
simply revolted. The industry argued that the more liability was
imposed by judges and juries after the fact based upon equitable
principles of fairness and justice, the less predictability and guid-
ance was available for accurate risk assessment and sound business
decisions e.6  The insurance industry effectively picked up its ball,
announced it would not play any longer, and left the field.
Citing its inability to set premiums because of shifting rules,
geometric increases both in numbers of tort judgments and in dol-
lars, broad scale exposure in the environmental, asbestos, mass
tort, and products liability arenas, and inadequate or nonexistent
reserves, the insurance companies, while raising premiums, either
refused to write policies or drastically cut back on the amount of
coverage. Critics argued that industry losses actually were due to
poor strategic planning, decreasing rates of return on increasingly
speculative investments, lax industry practice with respect to re-
serve requirements, or bookkeeping legerdemain, but the net effect
was the same: liability insurance became extremely expensive if it
was available at all.
As a result of the high costs of liability, some manufacturers
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP].
' Wheeler, A Proposal for Further Common Law Development of the Use of Punitive
Damages in Modern Product Liability Litigation, 40 ALA. L. REV. 919, 919 (1989) (footnotes
omitted).
6 REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, supra note 66, at 1.
6 In the course of seminars for senior federal managers, I tried to make this point by
analogizing an insurance company to a "bookie" and pointing out that no bookie would
accept a bet unless the odds were known. In the insurance business, this process is more
refined: it is called setting the premium. Unless there is a statistical and actuarial basis for
assessing risk and setting a premium, insurance companies will not underwrite coverage.
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ceased production of vaccines and drugs.7 0 Professional malprac-
tice premiums for doctors, engineers, accountants, and lawyers
skyrocketed, causing many to quit or curtail their practices; many
others decided to "go bare."'1 Municipalities lost coverage and put
a clamp on many activities, such as sledding in the parks and
swimming in the pools.7 2
Were it not for the Reagan Administration, we might never
have known that we were in the midst of a "Liability Crisis." I
joined the Torts Section of the Civil Division in September 1973,
and for the next decade or so we labored in relative obscurity. The
office was located about four blocks from the main Department of
Justice building, and we were treated with benign neglect by our
political leadership. Torts was not a sexy business, and, as long as
we did not lose too much money and stayed out of the newspapers,
we were left alone. All of that changed in 1985 when the Reagan
Administration made tort reform a major policy issue and created
the Tort Policy Working Group of the Domestic Policy Council,
which consisted of a senior administration official and general
counsels of eleven federal agencies.
The Group issued two reports that highlighted the practices
and problems of the insurance industry, publicized the adverse im-
pact of the doctrinal and substantive changes in tort law, docu-
mented the adverse economic and quality of life consequences suf-
fered by virtually all segments of society, and issued a clarion call
for insurance and tort reform, principally at state level.7 3 Although
many commentators challenged the underlying data, the methodol-
ogy, and the conclusions of the reports, the criticisms served to re-
70 Perhaps the most dramatic example is the Bendectin litigation, in which Merrell-
Dow decided to cease distribution of the drug in response to the thousands of tort suits
alleging that Bendectin caused birth defects. See Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Labs., 830"F.2d
1190, 1191 (1st Cir. 1987). Bendectin was an antinausea drug approved for use in pregnancy
by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") in 1956. Id. Ironically, scientific causation
between use of Bendectin and birth defects could not be proved, and the FDA never with-
drew its approval. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 943 (3d
Cir. 1990); see also Copulos, An Rx for the Product Liability Epidemic, Heritage Found.
Backgrounder, No. 434, (May 15, 1985) (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Omni file).
7' See, e.g., Moss, Going Bare: Practicing Without Malpractice Insurance, 73 A.B.A. J.
82, 82 (Dec. 1987) (considering dilemma of sole practitioner whose insurance rates rose so
high that "he decided to go bare").
72 See Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521,
1521-22 (1987) (insurance crisis affected jails, police patrols, parks and forest preserves, and
Fourth of July celebrations).
7' See AN UPDATE ON THE LIAsILrrY CRisis (1987); REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORK-
ING GRoup, supra note 66.
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inforce the popular conception that the system was indeed broke
and someone had to fix it.
One other player deserves mention: the Supreme Court. In a
number of decisions, the Court increased the vulnerability of cer-
tain segments of society. In Westfall v. Erwin7" a unanimous
Court effectively eliminated the immunity that had protected fed-
eral employees from liability for common law torts. 5 And, in two
cases, the Court ruled that judges were not above the fray. In Pul-
liam v. Allen 7 6 a state magistrate was not excused from having to
pay over $7,000 in fees to a successful plaintiff's attorney under 42
U.S.C. § 1988," and, in Forrester v. White7 the Court ruled that
judicial immunity did not protect a judge from a damages suit aris-
ing out of administrative or executive functions such as the alleg-
edly discriminatory firing of a probation officer. 9
V. THE LEGISLATURES STRIKE BACK
Propelled by the so-called "Liability Crisis" and cries for re-
form, the action shifted from the commercial and judicial arenas to
the legislatures.
The legislative tort reform movement has been successful be-
yond the hopes of its most ardent advocates. Academia was
caught napping. The legislative coup was so quick and ferocious
that commentators did not have time to react. Some early schol-
arly discussion focused on proposed federal product liability legis-
lation. However, oblivious to the debate in the nation's capital,
state legislatures created their own individualized "reform pack-
ages." Each piece of legislation, itself, is not earth shattering, but,
in toto, the changes have substantially altered the law of torts.8 0
Remedial legislation took two forms. One was directed at the in-
surance industry, and in every instance the result was increased
state regulation. According to a report issued by the Tort Policy
Working Group, "37 States placed restrictions on the manner in
which liability insurance policies can be canceled or not re-
7' 484 U.S. 292 (1988).
75 Id. at 295-98.
7I 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
77 Id. at 553.
78 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
79 Id. at 229-30.
80 Twerski, The Joint Tortfeasor Revolt: A Rational Response To The Critics, 22 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 1125, 1125-26 (1989).
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newed." l Twenty-two states authorized self-insurance programs or
the development of risk-pools.8 2 In addition, greater scrutiny of
rate increases was provided and "at least 21 states imposed some
degree of new information reporting requirements upon the insur-
ance industry. '8 3
The other legislative reform was directed to substantive tort
law. Professor Twerski notes that "[f]rom January 1986 to August
1988 some 35 states enacted significant tort reform legislation.
This figure does not include states that passed legislation dealing
with insurance reform. It also does not include states whose tort
reform legislation antedated January 1986. "8" The American Tort
Reform Association ("ATRA") reports that as of December 31,
1989, forty-one states had enacted some type of substantive tort
legislation. 5
No consensus can be drawn from the enactments of the vari-
ous state legislatures and indeed, consideration continues on some
issues today. Among the areas debated were joint and several lia-
bility, noneconomic damages such as pain and suffering, punitive
damages, periodic payments, the collateral source rule and, last but
not least, contingency fees. Some states have placed thresholds
upon the application of the joint and several liability doctrine.8 6
Sliding scales have been imposed upon contingency fees. Damages
for pain and suffering have been curtailed. Punitive damages have
been capped. 7
Reform was not confined to the state legislatures. On October
20, 1988, just nine months after the Supreme Court decision in
Westfall v. Erwin,"8 the 100th Congress unanimously overruled
Westfall and enacted the Federal Employees Liability Reform and
Tort Compensation Act of 1988.89 President Reagan signed it into
law on November 18, 1988. The Act provides that the sole remedy
:I UPDATE, supra note 73, at 74.
82 Id.
3 Id.
84 Twerski, supra note 80, at 1125 n.1.
85 See Ai. TORT REFORM ASS'N, TORT REFORM REP. (Dec. 31, 1989).
8 See Note, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Dam-
ages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 636 (1988)
("many comparative negligence states that had retained joint and several liability either
limited or eliminated joint and several liability").
'7 See Wheeler, supra note 67, at 927.
- 484 U.S. 292 (1988).
89 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1988).
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for a common law tort committed by a federal employee within the
scope of federal employment is a suit against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). Federal employees
cannot be sued personally for common law torts; this is true even if
there is some jurisdictional or legal bar that prevents a suit against
the sovereign.90 (It must be noted that Congress has yet to act on
proposed legislation that would afford increased protection for
judges!)
These reforms have not gone unchallenged. Efforts to repeal
state tort reforms have been strong and, in some cases, partially
successful. For example, ATRA reported that as of January 1,
1990, the score was tied in the battle to rescind limitations on pu-
nitive damages. Caps have been upheld in seven states and over-
turned in seven others. In July 1990, the ABA Journal noted that
caps on damages have been struck down by courts in thirteen
states."1
Whatever the merits of individual insurance and tort reform
proposals might be, it is clear that society said "Enough!" to the
untrammelled expansion of liability. While we were perhaps willing
to have the burden of loss shifted to the community at large, there
were limits; the defendants as well as the plaintiffs were entitled to
equitable treatment.
VI. TORT LAW FOR THE 1990'S
In this century we witnessed a slow but steady expansion of
liability fostered by a growing sense of equity and result-oriented
decisions reflecting a desire to compensate the injured. The 1980's
were marked by violent reactions to this growth as evidenced by
the revolt of the insurance industry, and then the legislative coun-
terrevolution. What will the 1990's bring?
The tone may well be set by the Supreme Court in the case of
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.9 2 which presents the the issue of
whether the federal law requiring warning labels on cigarettes
preempts tort suits under state laws for injuries and death due to
smoking. Oral argument was held before an eight-member Court
90 See United States v. Smith, 111 S. Ct. 1180, 1184 (1991). The Court held that "the
Liability Reform Act immunizes Government employees from suit even when an FTCA ex-
ception precludes recovery against the Government." Id. at 1189-90.
91 Anderson, Judge Rules on Tort Reform, 76 A.B.A. J. 31, 31 (July 1990).
92 893 F.2d 541 (3rd Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
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on October 8, 1991, the second day of the term. The significance of
the issue and the potential for divergent views were underscored
by an October 21, 1991, order setting the case for reargument in
January 1992 when the court can be expected to have nine
members.
It was the courts that set the stage for the tumult of the
1980's by expanding the bases for liability, by allowing or fostering
the blurring of classic tort concepts and, with increasing enthusi-
asm and candor, by sitting as courts of equity rather than as courts
of law. Robin Hood jurisprudence will continue for the simple rea-
son that these same courts are not likely to admit that they were in
error and rescind newly created duties and causes of action. That
is not to say that the amount of resources reallocated from those
who have (or are insured) to those who have not will be the same.
Legislative limitations upon attorney fees, joint and several liabil-
ity, noneconomic damages, and punitive damages may well result
in diminished recoveries even for successful plaintiffs. Moreover,
the public consciousness of the "Liability Crisis," whether it was
imagined or real, could have a sobering effect upon jury delibera-
tions and awards.
The courts necessarily will play a key role in determining the
ultimate impact of the "Liability Crisis" and the legislative reform
counterrevolution. As the savings and loan crisis and the financial
difficulties facing the insurance industry have moved toward center
stage, the enthusiasm for future legislative "tort reform" appears
to have waned. Nevertheless, the courts still will be called upon to
examine, uphold, or reject the reform enactments of recent years.
Recent data appear to indicate that continued expansion has
all but ceased. In preparing for this presentation, materials were
requested from the rivals in the tort reform wars, ATRA and the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America ("ATLA"). Surprisingly,
each of these combatants included with their responses a draft of
an article entitled The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability,
which was published in the February 1990 UCLA Law Review. Af-
ter conducting an exhaustive empirical review of the 2,526 product
liability decisions published between 1983 and 1988, the authors,
Cornell Professors James A. Henderson, Jr., and Theodore Eisen-
berg, concluded as follows:
American courts deciding products liability cases are in the midst
of a significant revolution. After decades of extending the bound-
aries of liability, both appellate and trial judges are reaching deci-
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sions favoring products defendants in unprecedented numbers.
Although it is difficult to pinpoint exactly when this legal change
began, we trace its origins to the early to mid-1980s. Clearly, it
has been in full swing for the past several years. Unlike most rev-
olutions, legal and nonlegal, this one has been amazingly quiet.
Other writers have observed that some recent claims of "crisis" in
products and other areas of tort are exaggerated. And pro-defend-
ant state legislative change has not gone unnoticed. But no one
has paid systematic attention to patterns of all products decisions
by courts. This Article discerns, and empirically establishes, that
major changes in judicial decision making are occurring. s3
The constitutional attack on punitive damages appears to be
over, at least on the federal level. The eighth amendment gauntlet
thrown down by Justice O'Connor in Bankers Life and Casualty
Co. v. Crenshaw9 4 and Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Dispo-
sal, Inc.,95 has not been taken up. On March 4, 1991, the Supreme
Court rejected a direct fourteenth amendment due process chal-
lenge to punitive damages by a vote of seven to one with Justice
O'Connor dissenting.9 6
In the past, when production line and factory injuries
threatened to overwhelm the judicial system and when automobile
accident cases grew by leaps and bounds, alternative compensation
schemes were devised that took most, if not all, of the disputes out
of the tort system. The 1990's may see similar reactions. Already in
place is a federal mechanism created by Congress to handle inju-
ries allegedly resulting from vaccines. No doubt prompted by the
swine flu experience, Congress in 1986 created the National Vac-
cine Injury Compensation Program, a no-fault informal process of
claims adjudication in which the only issues are medical causation
and the amount of damages. 7
For a decade, Senator Robert W. Kasten, Jr. (R. Wisc.) has
proposed legislation which, in various forms, would preempt state
93 Henderson & Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical
Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479, 539 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
486 U.S. 71, 88 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
95 492 U.S. 257, 277 (1989); see also Jeffries, supra note 4, at 139; Powell, Challenging
the Constitutionality of Noneconomic Damage Caps: Boyd v. Bulala and the Right to a
Trial by Jury, 24 WILLAmLTrE L. REV. 821, 829 (1988).
91 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1044 (1991).
97 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -19 (1988). The statute originally required that all claims be
submitted before October 1, 1990. During the last week of September 1990, before the dead-
line was extended by Congress to January 31, 1991, more than 3400 claims were filed.
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law and create national product liability standards and causes of
action. The Kasten bill drew only tepid, and occasionally nonexis-
tent, support from the Reagan Administration, in part, because the
concept of preemption ran counter to the loudly espoused princi-
ples of federalism. However, the Bush Administration actually fa-
vored strengthening the Kasten Bill in the 101st Congress, S. 1400.
Vice President Quayle, speaking as Chairman of the President's
Council on Competitiveness, declared that the "present state-by-
state system of liability laws 'generates excessive litigation, inflates
insurance costs and creates uncertainties for American businesses.
This is a self-imposed burden on our ability to compete.' ,98 The
Kasten bill would create a uniform product liability code, limit
joint and several liability to the percentage of fault, and prohibit
the award of punitive damages when the manufacturer of a drug or
aircraft respectively received approval for the product from the
Federal Drug Administration or the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion. The 101st Congress ended with the bill scheduled for a Sen-
ate vote and no action scheduled in the House.
CONCLUSION
It is too early to determine whether there has indeed been a
quiet revolution in product liability law or, if so, whether the
revolution is broad enough to embrace most or all of the law of
torts. As we wait for answers, we would do well to reflect upon the
observation of Professors Henderson and Eisenberg: "For anyone
who follows products liability [indeed, all of torts], these develop-
ments bring to mind the ancient Chinese curse: 'May you live in
interesting times.' ,9
SNat'1 L.J., Dec. 18, 1989, at 9, col. 1.
"9 Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 480.
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